We investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We also design contractual arrangements between the parties which allow the decentralized chain to perform as well as a centralized one. We address these questions in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of (competing) retailers, considering the following general model: retailers face random demands, the distribution of which may depend only on its own retail price (non-competing retailers) or on its own price as well as those of the other retailers (competing retailers) according to general stochastic demand functions.
Introduction
We investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. In such chains, it is important to determine who controls which decisions and in which ways the different chain members are compensated. Of particular interest is the specification of contractual arrangements between the parties which allow the decentralized chain to perform as well as a centralized one, in which all decisions are made by a single entity maximizing chain-wide expected profits. Such contracts are referred to as (perfect) coordination mechanisms. In this paper, we address these questions in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of (competing) retailers.
As part of the design of coordinating contracts, it is necessary to identify what type of contract is required to achieve specific beneficial outcomes. For example, when can coordination be achieved exclusively via a linear wholesale pricing scheme, i.e. with a constant per unit wholesale price? When does this constant wholesale price need to be differentiated by retailer and if so, on what basis? When are nonlinear wholesale pricing schemes required, with the per unit wholesale price discounted on the basis of the retailer's order quantity or his annual sales volume? Many supply chains routinely use a variety of trade deals to provide incentives for retailers to reduce their prices and increase sales, see e.g. Blattberg and Neslin (1990) . Such trade deals include "bill-backs" and "count-recounts", where the supplier reimburses the retailers, in whole or in part, for discounts off its regular retail price, for all units ordered or sold during a given period of time. The video rental industry has recently introduced "revenue-sharing" schemes, where the studios drastically reduce their wholesale prices to store chains such as Blockbuster, in exchange for a given percentage of the rental revenues. Such schemes are believed to increase supply-chain wide revenues by up to 30%, see e.g. Shapiro (1998) . To implement these schemes, the chain members find it worthwhile to retain a third-party (e.g. Rentrak) and reward it with no less than 10% of its revenues, so as to monitor all rentals.
1 Trade deals and revenue sharing programs can be viewed as mechanisms to share the risk between the supplier and the retailers. They increase in importance as the uncertainty about the product's sales increases. Other such risk-sharing mechanisms include buy-back agreements where the supplier commits himself to buy any unsold inventories back from the retailers, at part or all of the original cost, see Pasternack (1985) , Png (1995, 1997) .
We address the following general model: each retailer faces a random demand volume during a given sales season, the distribution of which may depend only on its own retail price (non-competing retailers) or on its own price as well as those of the other retailers (competing retailers) according to general stochastic demand functions. All retailers order a one-time procurement from the supplier at the beginning of the season.
The simplest model has a single retailer facing demand with a known, exogenously given, distribution, as in the classical newsvendor problem and with a supplier incurring linear production costs. Generalizing Spengler's (1950) seminal result on double marginalization, Pasternack (1985) showed that perfect coordination can be achieved with a simple constant wholesale price only, set equal to the supplier's per unit procurement cost, i.e. provided double marginalization is avoided. This, of course, results in an unsatisfactory arrangement for the supplier, whose profits vanish. As an alternative, Pasternack proposes a buy back arrangement under which a constant wholesale price, larger than the per unit procurement cost, is combined with a constant partial refund for any unit that remains unsold. Coordination can be achieved via any one of a continuum of wholesale price/buy back rate combinations. See Lariviere (1999) , Cachon (1999) , Tsay, Nahmias and Agrawal (1999) , and Taylor (2000) for an extensive treatment of this model as well as alternative types of coordination mechanisms.
As stated by Kandel (1996) , the situation is considerably more complex when the retailer chooses his retail price and the demand distribution depends on this price. Lariviere (1999) quotes Kandel as claiming that no payment scheme with a constant per unit wholesale price and buy back rate induces perfect coordination, even though Emmons and Gilbert (1998) showed that under such buy back contracts, both the supplier and the retailer may improve their profits. (The only exception, of course, is the trivial arrangement under which the wholesale price equals the supplier's per unit procurement cost and his profits are eliminated.)
After verifying formally that, under an endogenously determined retail price, no payment scheme with a constant per unit wholesale price (larger than the supplier's per unit procurement cost) and a constant buy back rate can achieve coordination for any problem instance, we show that a so-called linear "price discount sharing" scheme does. This scheme is closely related to the more commonly known "bill-backs" and "count-recounts". Ailawadi et al. (1999) demonstrate the prevalence of this type of trade promotions as well as its ad-vantages over other types of schemes. The payment scheme continues to be combined with the supplier's commitment to buy back any of the unsold units at a constant below the per unit wholesale price, net of any subsidy.
We show that the same linear price discount sharing scheme coordinates the chain when dealing with a network of non-competing retailers. Under retail competition, the choices any given retailer makes for its price and stocking quantity impact not just its own profit, but that of each of its competitors as well. This applies even under the simplest possible contractual arrangements with the supplier, e.g. under constant per unit wholesale prices. We characterize the equilibrium behavior of the decentralized chain under such payment schemes and show that coordination can, again, be achieved with a price discount sharing scheme, except that the supplier's share or subsidy in the retailer's discount (from its reference value) now fails to be proportional with the size of the discount. While the price discount sharing scheme is universally applicable, we identify a second scheme, with constant per unit wholesale prices, which induces perfect coordination under a broad class of demand functions and distributions.
As mentioned, the literature on coordination mechanisms in decentralized supply chains with price setting or competing retailers, under demand uncertainty is sparse. This is in contrast to the literature on deterministic models in which, starting with the single retailer, single period model in the seminal paper by Spengler (1950) , an understanding has been reached for general infinite horizon settings with competing and non-competing retailers, see Chen, Federgruen and Zheng (1997) and Bernstein and Federgruen (2001a) and the many references cited therein. (All of these assume that demands occur at a constant deterministic rate; some allow for more general cost structures.) Recall, almost all of the literature on competitive stochastic systems with endogenously determined retail prices, has focused on models with a single retailer. Other than the above references, we mention Li and Atkins (2000) in which, at the beginning of the period, the supplier and the retailer simultaneously and without cooperation choose a production capacity level and retail price, respectively.
The authors show that the decentralized chain can be coordinated with a quantity discount scheme combined with the retailer paying a fixed portion of the cost of unused capacity.
The study of oligopoly models, with uncertainty with respect to demands (or certain cost parameters) was initiated in the economics literature. These models ignore the problem of mismatches between supply and demand and the associated costs of over-and understock- A second related stream of papers considers competitive newsvendor problems in which the distribution of the primary demand for each of the firms' products as well as the retailer prices are exogenously given. Interdependency and competition between the firms arise because some or all of the unmet demand at a given firm is redirected as a secondary demand stream towards one of the competitors offering a substitute product. Parlar (1988) and Wang and Parlar (1994) initiated this type of model, analyzing a two-and three firm oligopoly, respectively. Lippman and McCardle (1997) and Rudi and Netessine (1999) consider models with an arbitrary number of firms and various joint distributions for the primary demand as well as various allocation rules for the substitution or secondary demands. They establish conditions for the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium. Anupindi and Bassok (1999) address a model with 2 firms, establishing the first (perfect) coordination result for a decentralized supply chain with uncertain demands and competing retailers. Bryant (1980) appears to be the first published paper to address the setting of our paper, i.e. a competitive oligopoly model with stochastic demands, endogenously determined prices and with retailer procurements and stocking levels determined in advance of demand realizations. In this model, the retailers simultaneously announce their prices and stocking levels; demands arise from a finite customer population, each with an identical stochastic demand function. Customers are sequentially released to the market and select the firm with the lowest price among those whose inventory has not been exhausted by prior customers.
The author shows that no Nash equilibrium exists unless the retailers can be partitioned into two groups, with the second group of market "entrants" announcing their pricing and stocking decisions after the decisions of the first group are revealed and unless the number of entrants is sufficiently large. Another such model is Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1997) addressing a market with a continuum of identical retailers offering a completely homogenous product. (See also Deneckere, Marvel and Peck (1996) and Deneckere and Peck (1995) for related models.)
Most directly related to our paper are Birge et al. (1998 ), Carr et. al (1999 and van Mieghem and Dada (1999 
i.e. expected revenues decrease to zero as the price increases to infinity.
At the start of the period, each retailer i chooses his retail price p i and y i , the quantity to order from the supplier. For each retailer, the same uniform price applies to all units sold.
This means that the retailers do not apply price discrimination by segmenting their markets.
Moreover, as e.g. for catalog retailers, the sales process does not allow for price adjustments on the basis of intermediate demand and inventory observations during the single period.
Settings with price adjustments need to be analyzed with multi-period models as in Bernstein and Federgruen (2001b) . Any unmet demand is lost while any excess inventory at retailer i can be salvaged to an outside firm at a given per unit salvage rate −∞ < v i < ∞. The supplier has ample capacity to satisfy all retailer orders and does so with a constant per unit procurement cost c i for retailer i. 
Similarly, the retailer's profit function under the constant (w, b)-contract is given by:
π R is strictly concave in y. Thus, for any retail price p > w the retailer's optimal order quantity is the unique root of ∂π R /∂y, giving rise to the well known newsvendor solution
:
Substituting y R (p) in (2), the retailer's optimal profits can be expressed as a continuous function of his retail price p only. Note that profits are non-positive when p = 0 or when under the broadly satisfied conditions of this theorem. In the next section, we characterize, in a more general setting, the impact of various parameters on the optimal retailer choices.
The decentralized system can be coordinated by choosing w = c and b = v since in this case the profit functions π R and π I coincide. As mentioned in §1, this contract is hardly satisfying since it leaves the supplier with zero profits. We now verify that no other (w, b)-contract is capable of coordinating the system. Thus, if an optimal solution (p I , y I ) for the integrated system is to be adopted by the retailer, it must optimize his expected profit function π R and hence it must satisfy the first order conditions:
(4) and (5) are a system of two linear equations in two unknowns (w, b) with a unique solution.
( (5) only involves the variable b, whose coefficient
by the strict stochastic monotonicity of D(p). Thus (5) has a unique solution in b which, when substituted into (4) results in a unique solution for w.) Since the pair (c, v) satisfies (4) and (5), no other contract with constant wholesale price and buy-back rate coordinates the system when the retail price p is endogenously determined. This is in sharp contrast to the case of an exogenously specified retail price p, where Pasternack (1985) exhibited a continuum of coordinating (w, b)-contracts.
We now show that coordination can be achieved with a linear Price Discount Sharing scheme (PDS). Here, the wholesale price is a linear function of the retail price, i.e. w = w(p)
is specified as:
w 0 is a constant base or gross wholesale price, p 0 an arbitrary reference value, e.g. the "list price" and α > 0 a constant. The PDS is to be combined with a traditional buy-back arrangement, at a buyback rate set at a given constant δ below the (net) wholesale price, i.e.,
Under the scheme (6), (7), the supplier compensates the retailer for every sold unit at the rate of α$ for every dollar the retailer discounts from the reference value p 0 . Lal et al. (1996) consider such a shared price discount scheme, however restricting the retailer to one possible discount size only; they also discuss a Cooperative Merchandising Agreement in the consumer packaged goods industry which embodies this type of PDS. In an article in the Sloan Management Review, Ailawadi et al. (1999) report on an increasing trend towards trade promotions 2 and explain that the most effective discount schemes tie the supplier's price directly to the retailer price according to a given PDS. For the special case where D(p) = 4, 000p −2 with probability one, they assert that no constant wholesale price which leaves the supplier with a positive margin, will result in optimal supply-chain wide performance, nor will any scheme which offers a single discounted wholesale price value if the retailer is willing to adopt a retail price at (or below) the chain-wide optimal price level p I .
On the other hand, they propose a specific non-linear PDS under which perfect coordination is achieved.
3 Our results below show that the simpler, linear PDS (6) can be used for a given, constant sharing fraction α across the entire price range; moreover, the fraction α can be chosen arbitrarily between 0 and 1, giving rise to a continuum of perfect coordination schemes. See however §3, where a non-linear PDS, is required under retailer competition.
The authors also report that in a series of interviews, several retail executives in charge of trade promotions indicate that virtually 100% of their promotions involve PDSs instead of traditional quantity discount schemes.
The pricing scheme also bears close resemblance to the traditional "bill back" or "countrecount" schemes, see Blattberg and Neslin (1990, Chapter 11 
We will see, however, that coordination can be achieved under (6), (7) for an arbitrary choice of the reference value p 0 and a continuum of α-values in (0, 1).
Theorem 1 3 The retailer is fully compensated for any price discounts in the range from $14 to $12 (∆w = ∆p), but only 75% of retail price discounts in the range from $12 to $8 are shared by the supplier (∆w = 0 · 75∆p) and an increasingly lower percentage for retail price discounts beyond the $8 value (∆w = 0 · 35∆p) for price discounts below the $5 value.
Equation (21) in the proof shows that under the scheme (6), (7) the fraction of the supply-chain profits earned by the supplier is given by α, and that of the retailer by (1 − α).
Participation constraints for the supplier and the retailer, e.g. ensuring that their expected profits are in excess of those achieved prior to coordination, result in a lower bound α and upper bound α respectively. The exact choice of α ∈ [α, α] depends on the chain members'
bargaining powers, but all such choices result in perfect coordination. Substituting (8) into (6), (7), one verifies that:
thus results in a larger wholesale price and buy-back rate, as well as higher profits for the supplier, confirming empirical observations, see e.g. Padmanabhan and Png (1995) , that suppliers often prefer more generous buy-back commitments, even when combined with less than equal increases in the wholesale price.
Clearly, the higher wholesale price applies to all units purchased by the retailer but the increased buy-back rate only to the unsold ones. Padmanabhan and Png (1995) report examples of suppliers (e.g. McKesson, a major national distributor of hospital supplies) offering a menu of alternative returns policies, in which options with more generous return privileges are linked to higher wholesale prices.
The proof of Theorem 1(b) reveals that, under (6), (7),
with R(p, y) the expected revenues (from direct sales and salvage)
earned by the retailer in the absence of a buy-back agreement. This shows that an alternative coordination scheme arises when charging the retailer a wholesale price w = (1 − α)c but requiring him to share a fraction α of his revenues with the supplier. This alternative scheme is equivalent to the PDS scheme in the sense that it generates identical profits for both firms for any demand realization. 4 Recall from §1, the introduction of such revenue sharing schemes in the video rental industry has drastically improved the performance of the supply chains, even though it requires an outside party to monitor and report the revenues of the retailers to the studios. 5 In contrast, implementation of the price discount sharing scheme (6) only requires monitoring of the retail price. This is particularly easy when the retailer publishes his (uniform) price via publicly available media such as catalogs, newspapers and magazine 4 A third alternative coordination scheme is based on sharing of the revenues from direct sales only, where now the percentage paid to the supplier is specified as a (nonlinear) function of the retail price, see Cachon Remark 1. In general, scheme (6) cannot be implemented as a traditional quantity discount scheme, i.e. a scheme in which the wholesale price is specified as a function of the order size, or the annual sales volume. While for any given retail price p, the optimal corresponding order quantity is uniquely specified by y R (p) = y I (p) = G to have an inverse when, e.g., α = 20, β = 1 and s = 0.5. This implies that the retail price cannot be expressed as a function of the order quantity, so that the PDS scheme cannot be specified as a traditional discount scheme.
6 Even in settings, outside the one addressed by our model, in which the retailers use non-uniform prices, the scheme still incents the retailers to report all sales to which a discount off the reference value p 0 is applied, provided p 0 is set sufficiently high. 7 Indeed, Ailawadi et al. (1999) argue that "Linking manufacturer price to retailer price rather than the quantity bought (or the amount sold) by the retailer is a simple solution to the coordination problem. It is easily understood, administered, and monitored; it also alleviates many problems and costs involved in other trade promotions".
8 The ruling states: "A brewery may offer promotions involving a beer price reduction to wholesalers contingent upon the wholesalers passing price savings on to retailers, and a wholesaler may offer promotions involving a beer price reduction to retailers contingent upon the retailers passing price savings on to consumers."
Turning to the general N -retailer model, Theorem 1 carries over since the integrated profit function π I is separable in all (p i , y i )-pairs. In particular, no scheme with constant wholesale prices and buy back rates {(w i , b i )} induces coordination except for the trivial scheme w i = c, b i = v, but the following generalization of (6), (7) does. For any given reference price p 0 , let ∆p i = p i − p 0 . For any 0 < α i < 1, i = 1, ..., N , let:
General Competing Retailers
In this Section, we consider the general case of N competing retailers. Here, the demand faced 
In addition, we will assume: (A) For each i = 1, ..., N , the function log d i (p) has increasing differences 9 in (p i , p j ) for all j = i. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ].
We first characterize the equilibrium (i.e. the set of retailer orders and prices) when wholesale prices and buy-back rates are constant. Let π i (p, y) denote the expected profits for retailer i:
While a retailer's price p impacts on the profits of all retailers, his order quantity y affects his own profits only. It thus follows from (10) and (12) that for any price p i , retailer i's optimal corresponding order is given by the equationG i (y i |p)
This observation permits us to reduce the non-cooperative game in the (p, y)-space to one in which retailers compete with a single instrument (p) only. We refer to this game as the reduced retailer game, as opposed to the original retailer game in which each retailer competes with his price variable and order quantity. Indeed, substituting (13) into (12), we get the retailers' profits as a function of p only:
9 A function f (x 1 ,· · ·,x N ) has increasing differences in (
. If the function f is twice differentiable, the property is equivalent to
where 
The proof in this case is thus analogous to the proof given in the Appendix.
Since, under assumption (A), the retailer game is "log-supermodular", see Topkis (1998) We have not encountered any instances with multiple equilibria. Moreover, let
The following theorem guarantees that a unique Nash equilibrium exists in the (possibly restricted) price space This assumption applies, at least in equilibrium, to almost every industry: virtually without exception retailers restrict their price choices to values under which the cost of understockage exceeds that of overstockage, i.e. under which they are incented to provide a fill rate of at least 50%.) The first condition is the most generally known sufficient condition for a unique Nash equilibrium to exist in the deterministic retailer game, see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) .
This condition is satisfied for all of the above stated classes of demand functions {d i (p)} with minor parameter restrictions, see Bernstein et al. (1999) .
The second condition provides a restriction for the distributions of the random vari-
for all x ≥ m i , where m i = the median of the distribution G i . This condition is e.g. satisfied for all distributions whose hazard rate h(x)
for all x ≥ m i . This class includes most of the commonly used distributions, e.g. the Exponentials and all Normals with mean one and standard deviation s ≤ 1. Condition (S) is also satisfied for all power distribution, i.e. when G i (x) is of the form G i (x) = ( 
Theorem 3
Recall from Theorem 2(c) that, even in the presence of multiple equilibria, p is the equilibrium that is preferred by all N retailers. Moreover, as explained above, the restriction p i ≥p min i applies, at least in equilibrium, to almost every industry. Thus, markets tend to converge to p, the unique equilibrium in the (possibly restricted) price space and the one which is preferred by all retailers.
We now investigate what impact the wholesale prices and buy-back rates have on the equilibrium. In the deterministic model, it is well known (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , Topkis (1998) and Vives (1990) ) that an increase in one of the wholesale prices results in an increase of all equilibrium retailer prices, provided conditions (A), (D) are satisfied. We show that this result continues to apply in the general stochastic model, under conditions (A), (D) and a strengthening of condition (S) as follows:
(Recall, we identified condition (S) as a general sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium.) Similarly, one would expect that an increase in one of the buyback rates, say b i , will result in a decrease of all retailers' equilibrium prices: the increase in b i results in an increase of retailer i's profit margin under the given retailer price; the increased profit margin allows retailer i to reduce his price, which induces all competitors, offering substitutable products, to reduce their price as well. Indeed, we prove that this conjecture holds, again under conditions (A), (D), and a further strengthening of (S), as follows:
.., N , and all x ≥ m i , In the absence of retailer competition, we showed that the chain can be coordinated with a simple linear PDS. We now show that with price competition, perfect coordination can still be induced with a PDS, albeit that this scheme now requires a nonlinear component. As before letπ I (p) denote the expected profits in the integrated system under the price vector p and optimal corresponding order quantities {y
Analogous to the derivation of (14), it is now easily verified thatπ
where, for j = 1, ..., N , π
denote the profits obtained in the deterministic integrated system for sales at retailer j, and where L j is the factor by which the profits arising from sales at retailer j are reduced, due to the demand uncertainty. Recall from (13) that under a price discount sharing scheme
Thus, to induce perfect coordination, it is desirable to ensure that under any prevailing price vector p, each retailer j adopts an order quantity y j (p) = y I j (p), which is equivalent to the
, and by the monotonicity of the inverse cdf,
In other words, the pricing scheme must ensure that the retailers face the same critical fractile in the decentralized system as they do in the integrated system. Under (17), it follows from (14) that for each retailer i = 1, ..., N ,
Let p I denote an optimal price vector for the integrated system. We now design the pricing scheme as an application of Groves (1973) ' mechanism. This means that we ensure for each retailer i that, when all other retailers' prices are chosen as in p I , his profit function in the decentralized system is a monotone transformation of the reduced integrated profit function,
i.e.,π i (p i , p
→ . More specifically, we choose Γ i as an affine transformation, as follows:
where 0 < α i < 1, and
represents the optimal expected profits in the integrated system derived from all sales excluding those at retailer i. Substituting (18) and (16) into (19) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
Choosing an arbitrary reference price value p
, as the list price or recommended retailer price), the wholesale price scheme can be rewritten as
where
i . The scheme thus generalizes the linear price discount sharing scheme for non-competing retailers. The competitive dynamics between the retailers, in particular the impact any retailer's price decision has on the sales of all other retailers, induces the need for a non-linear correction term, the magnitude of which is directly related to the magnitude of the cross-effects ∂d j /∂p i , j = i, in the demand functions,
Note that when retailer i chooses his price p i > p I i , the correction term is negative, i.e. the wholesale price is adjusted downwards compared to its value in the non-competitive model. On the other hand, when the retailer sets his price too low, i.e. p i < p I i , the wholesale price is adjusted upwards compared to its value in the absence of competition. In equilibrium, when p i = p 
The question remains whether perfect coordination can be achieved with a set of constant wholesale prices w * and buy-back rates b * . Theorem 1 shows that in the absence of competition, the only such scheme has w * i = c i and b * i = v i for all i = 1, ..., N , and this scheme is hardly appealing since it eliminates the supplier's profits entirely. In the presence of competition, the following theorem affirms the existence of a coordinating scheme with constant wholesale prices, provided conditions apply that guarantee the existence of a unique price equilibrium which increases in the vector of wholesale prices. (Recall, Theorem 4(a) identifies a broad class of demand distributions under which this is guaranteed.) Moreover, the coordinating vector of wholesale prices w * satisfies the desired inequalities c i < w * i < p I i for all i = 1, ..., N , thus invoking double marginalization as a mechanism to induce, rather than prohibit, perfect coordination. 
Theorem 6 Assume conditions (A), (D) and (S
Remark 3 If the inequality in (S w ) is strict, one easily verifies from the above proof that the coordinating vector of wholesale prices w * is unique.
We have thus identified two possible coordination schemes. The constant wholesale pricing scheme is clearly simpler than the price discount sharing scheme. For the latter, a wholesale price (7), with w 0 and δ specified as in (8):
Thus, any optimal solution (p I , y I ) of π I (·, ·) optimizes π R as well.
Proof of Lemma 1. As a function of
, an increasing function of f i , the loss factor can be written as
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove parts (a) and (b) we show that the reduced retailer game is log-supermodular, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) . Since each of the retailers competes with a single instrument chosen from a compact set, it suffices to show that for all i = 1, ..., N , logπ i (p) has increasing differences in (p i , p j ) for all j = i. By (14),
The required property follows from assumption (A) and the fact that the second and third terms in (22) Proof of Theorem 3. Since (A) applies, the retailer game has a Nash equilibrium, by Theorem 2. Uniqueness follows from Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 
In view of (D) and the fact that the second term to the right of (23) 
, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) , it suffices to show that ∂ 2 logπ i (p)/∂p i ∂w i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., N . By (23), this is equivalent to ∂ 2 logL i (p)/∂p i ∂w i ≥ 0, since the first term in (23) does not depend on w. Using (24), we obtain
again substituting x = G −1 i (f i ) ≥ 1 since f i > 1/2, by (15).
(b) Since (S b ) ⇒ (S), the proof is analogous to that of part (a), and it suffices to show that ∂ 2 logπ(p)
Using (24), we obtain 
